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BRIEFER CONTRIBUTIONS
FUNCTIONS OF JUDGE AND COUNSEL IN THE
EXAMINATION OF JURORS
CHARLES T. McCoRMICK1
When Alphonse Capone, over-
lord of criminal gangdom, recently
went to trial for defrauding the
United States of income taxes, the
eyes of the nation were centered
upon a Federal court-room in Chi-
cago. The wide notoriety of the
defendant's long and prosperous
career, and seeming immunity from
state interference, made it inevit-
able that the Federal trial would be
closely watched and constantly com-
pared with the image of what would
have occurred had he been on his
trial in a state court.
One contrast was apparent at the
outset and widely commented upon
in the press. This was in regard
to the manner of selecting the jury.
The astonishing thing was that the
judge, and not the lawyers, as-
sumed responsibility for ascertain-
ing whether the persons summoned
for jury-service were qualified.
Judge Wilkerson asked the few and
simple questions which would dis-
close the fair or prejudiced atti-
tudes of the venire-men, in a man-
ner which assumed that they would
be entirely open and frank in ex-
pressing them. He accepted from
counsel suggestions as to additional
questions, but all actual questioning
was done by the court. In a few
hours, and in an atmosphere of
quiet decorum, twelve men were
selected to try the defendant.
'Professor of Law in Northwestern
University.
Had Capone been on trial in a
typical state court, how would this
matter have been handled? The
judge would first have examined
the whole panel of jurors as to their
statutory qualifications, such as resi-
dence within the county, the facts
as to kinship with the parties, and
as to prejudice or fixed opinion
about the case. Those disqualified
would be excused. Then each mem-
ber of the panel would be examined
and cross-examined by counsel on
each side to determine whether
either side might desire to chal-
lenge him peremptorily. This ex-
amination would in a serious case
be as searching as the indulgence
of the court would permit, into the
life-history of each individual juror,
his friendships and affiliations, and
his feelings and predilections to-
ward crime and punishment.
Without mentioning the more ex-
travagant of such inquiries of law-
yers to jurors which are the stock-
in-trade of many trial court-rooms,
a few of the more restrained queries
which have been approved in recent
decisions will give a sampling.2
What church do you belong to?
What other organization ?3 Do you
know the defendant, the witnesses,
the lawyers? If the court should
2See State v. Miller (Mo.) 207 S. W.
797 (1918) and numerous cases cited
under title "Jury" sec. 131, Decennial
and Current Digests.
3Young v. State, 41 Okl. Cr. 226, 271
P. 426 (1928).
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charge you that so-and-so is the
law would you recognize and fol-
low this? If it appears that de-
fendant has been convicted of other
offenses would you regard this as
evidence against him? Would you
disregard evidence given by a wit-
ness of unsavory reputation ?'
Would you convict because the
other jurors believed the defendant
guilty? Because you desired to go
home? Do you believe (in a mur-
der case) in the law of self-de-
fense and of excusable homicide? 6
And so on to the limit of the in-
genuity of counsel.
An instance is cited of "the trial
of a labor-union slugger, where the
selection of a jury consumed nine
and a half weeks, involved the sum-
moning of ten thousand veniremen,
the examination of nearly five thou-
sand talesmen, and entailed a cost
to the state of forty or fifty thou-
sand dollars."7  Such exuberance
would hardly be conceivable in these
piping times, but even within the
last decade in Illinois there have oc-
curred some glaring examples. of
riotous waste of time. The fol-
lowing was written in 1926. "The
Sweet-Highten case was begun De-
cember 1, and the verdict was re-
ceived on Christmas eve of last
year. More than two weeks were
required to empanel the jury. The
Lincoln case required as much time.
In the Stokes case in Chicago (not
a homicide case) more than three
weeks were required to empanel the
4People v. Ranney (Calif. App.) 293
P. 887 (1930).
5Turner v. State, 171 Ark. 1118, 287
S. W. 400 (1926).
6People v. Bennett, 79 Calif App. 76,
249 P. 20 (1926).
7Willoughby "Principles of Judicial
Administration" (1929) p. 510.
jury; and a like time was required
in the Shepherd case." 8
Why this elaborate and exhaust-
ing inquisition into the lives and
minds of men who after all are not
on trial but are merely summoned
to give their time disinterestedly in
the service of justice? From the
point of view of the lawyer intent
only on victory for his side, the
questioning is by no means idle. In
view of the wide powers of per-
emptory challenge of jurors, this in-
quisition will become a competitive
process of sifting the panel down
to a final twelve, with victory to
him whose counsel winnows most
expertly. Since it is hard to find
persons whose views lean against
the prosecution, an attempt at
"evening up" is usually made by
giving the defense two or three
times as many peremptory chal-
lenges as the number allotted to the
state.
An Oregon trial judge voiced the
opinion of many trial lawyers when
he said: "It seems to me that the
adoption of this rule [limiting ex-
amination of jurors by counsel] in
its practical application is going to
substantially destroy the right of
peremptory challenge. Theoretically
it will not, but practically every -ex-
perienced trial lawyer realizes that
that is what is going to happen.
The value of an examination lies
in the expression of the man's face,
the hesitating or prompt manner of
his answer, his shifty or firm
glance of the eye-a number of per-
sonal eccentricities that all come to
the surface with a close, rapid,
searching examination which can-
not be given by the judge, because
the juror then takes it easily and
8Reid "English Criminal Trials of
Today," 10 Marquette L. Rev. 27, 32
(1925).
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either doesn't make any answer or
forgets, quite often sincerely for-
gets."9
Again, the emphasis which the
trial lawyer, who is accustomed to
this practice, comes to place upon
the supposedly incidental matter of
selecting the jury, is reflected in
this candid passage from an ad-
dress by a skilled and experienced
advocate: "And it has come to be
well recognized generally that a
litigant may get the best legal ser-
vice obtainable; he may have, to
many right thinking minds, the pre-
ponderance of testimony and right;
but if his lawyer 'can't pick a jury'
his chances for success in that court
are very slim. In this paragraph I
have stated the proposition mildly.
We all know and recognize the dif-
ficulties present always, on one side
or the other, in selecting twelve
fair-minded, impartial and compe-
tent men to try almost any case,
and certainly any case of moment
or of considerable public interest.
The popularity of one or the other
of the parties, the personal influ-
ence of the lawyer, the vocation of
the plaintiff or the defendant, the
age, the sex, the political or re-
ligious affiliation or activity of
either or both parties. Opulence or
poverty, business, fraternal or so-
cial connections-does either party
trade with one of the jurors, or
vice-versa-is a juror client to one
of the lawyers, or does one of the
attorneys hold a mortgage on one
of the jurors? Who is kin to who,
and what are a juror's environ-
ments? One or more of these and
like inquiries and influences operate
to a more or less extent in the trial
of every jury case, and ofttimes de-
termine the merits of the cadse.
9Report, Judicial Council, 4 Ore. L.
Rev. 263, 270 (1925).
Does the lawyer of the litigant go
fishing or hunting with one or more
of the jurors--do they play dom-
inoes or poker or golf together?
Whom does he work for? Is he
'dry' or 'wet'?-An hundred asso-
ciations or influences of such nature
tend to give one side or the other
an advantage even in civil cases,
and in criminal cases it is just im-
possible to appraise the value of
these equations. Prejudice, pos-
sibly, has more to do in determining
the mind and verdict of a juror than
anything else-unless it be self-in-
terest, and this, of course, is a
species of prejudice-like passion
or envy or jealousy." 10
In many states counsel in their
inquisition are permitted to go to
the length of rehearsing to each
prospective juror the states of fact
which in the trial they hope to
establish, and then the instructions
on the law which they hope that the
court will give, and by way of pre-
text for this, inquiring of each
juror whether he would have any
difficulty or unwillingness in accept-
ing and applying such "law" and
"facts." As this is customarily done
in the presence of the whole panel,
the repetition with adroit variations
of counsel's version of the crime or
defense may often make a deep un-
conscious impression in the negative
minds of the jurors finally remain-
ing after the completion of the
screening process. Those who give
signs of any intelligent independent
consideration of the questions asked
will readily be rejected. Moreover,
it gives additional time and oppor-
tunity for the counsel whose per-
sonality is the more forceful or
winning to weave his spell about
the jury.
1Orion. T. D. Samford (1928) Pro-
ceedings, Ala. St. Bar Asso. 143-4.
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What effect does this sort of ir-
responsible and extended inquisition
have upon the minds of the jury-
men finally chosen to try the case?
Probably it will outrage and irri-
tate many of the veniremen and
forever disgust them with the proc-
esses of justice. They will be elim-
inated. Those who remain will
necessarily be imbued with the im-
pression that the trial is to be a
proceeding where the personal
whims and prejudices of the jurors
will properly play a large part in
the result. They are psychologi-
cally tested, picked, and prepared for
the highest degree of receptivity to
emotional appeal. It is difficult to
conceive a more effective method to
enable the tribunal to "divorce old
barren Reason" from the trial.
Though this is in some respects
a minor stage in the trial,"' it has
real significance as a phase of the
epic and unconscious conflict be-
tween the ideal of a trial managed
by a judge as its central figure and
the widely prevalent, but never
openly avowed, conception of a
trial as a contest in a squared circle
between trial lawyers where (within
due bounds of decency) superior
skill, luck, personality and learning
should be free to prevail. It is as
distasteful to a certain type of trial-
12Except as bearing upon the re-
spective roles of judge and counsel,
the examination of prospective jurors
in court is of less intrinsic importance
than the administrative procedure for
the original selection of the jurymen
to be summoned. The quality of the
stream must be chiefly protected at its
source. An illuminating description
of the defects to which a system of
summoning jurors from a metropolitan
area may be subject, appears in Crim-
inal Justice in Cleveland (1922) ch.
XI. Cf. Bruce "Summary, Illinois
Crime Survey" 19 J. Am. Inst. Cr. L.
and Cr. Appendix, 31 (1929); Mis-
souri Crime Survey, 178-180 (19265.
lawyer for the judge to assume any
active and masterful role before the
jury as it would be to a boxer for
the referee to make himself the
most conspicuous figure in the ring.
The trial lawyer has, both in his
own mind and to a large degree in
the minds of the press and the pub-
lic, been able to associate the class-
interested demand for a weakening
of control of the trial by the judge,
with the democratic ideal. Cor-
respondingly he has been able to
fasten the stigma of autocracy upon
the opposing demand for such pre-
dominance by the judge as will
safe-guard justice and respect for
law. This transference has been
made easier by the accompanying
weakening of the personnel of the
bench by making judges elective for
short terms. Seemingly this per-
version of the democratic dogma has
never prevailed in the other coun-
tries which have inherited the Eng-
lish legal tradition. Canada, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, though in some
respects more responsive in govern-
ment to popular control than we
are, and in some respects much more
"radical" in sentiment, retain the
judge as a life-time functionary with
all his traditional pre-eminence at
the trial, as the personal symbol of
law and justice.
Surely no more critical test of
supremacy between judge and advo-
cate could be presented than the
question of the judge's privilege to
conduct the examination into the
qualifications of the sworn and paid
officers of the court who are to form
a part of the tribunal over which
the judge presides. It is noteworthy
that most of the proposals for the
establishment of the dignified prac-
tice of examination by the judges
come from the judges themselves.
In the Federal courts the Confer-
ence of Senior Circuit judges rec-
738 BRIEFER CONTRIBUTIONS
ommended the practice to the trial
judges in 1923,12 and it has been
generally adopted in those courts."
A few state courts seem to have
preserved this as a traditional prac-
tice.14 In the other states, judicial
efforts to assume responsibility for
ascertaining the qualifications of
prospective jurors have been quickly
resented by trial lawyers. In Ore-
gon, such a proposal by Circuit
Judge Tucker before the Judicial
Council met with hot opposition.
A representative of the bar said:
"Personally I would prefer to select
my own jury, and we do that from
the mental attitude that is exhibited
by the jury in response to the ques-
tions, and something that the at-
torney cannot get when the judge
asks the same question. We have
discussed this question very thor-
oughly in our local Bar meetings
12The Federal Judicial Council, 2
Tex. L. Rev. 458, 461 (1924).
"aThe Supreme Court has recognized
the practice approvingly, but has on
occasion, reversed the trial judge for
abuse of discretion in declining to ex-
amine the jurors upon some essential
matter when requested by counsel. Al-
dridgqe v. U. S. 51 S. Ct. 470 (1931).
(Refusal to inquire as to racial preju-
dice of jurors in the District of
Columbia, where defendant, a negro
was charged with killing a white
man.)
141n Alabama, California, Idaho,
South Carolina, Utah, and perhaps
some other states, by custom or statute
the trial judge seems to conduct the
examination of the jurors, with some
discretionary latitude in permitting
supplemental examination by counsel.
In most of the other states, by law
or custom, the counsel seem to be per-
mitted a wide range of examination as
a basis for peremptory challenge. No
attempt has been made to investigate
in detail the statutes and decisions of
the particular states. See Digests cited,
n. 1 supra; statutes cited, Am. Law
Inst. Code Cr. Pro. Tentative Draft,
No. 2 (1929) pp. 265-271; Comment,
18 Calif. L. Rev. 70 (1929).
down there and out of the thirty-
four members of our local Bar one
member thought that it might be a
good rule and thirty-three of us
were opposed to it, and I believe
that that is a fair proportion of the
attorneys throughout the state out-
side of Portland."'1  Other judges
present took the part of the lawyers
and seemingly the proposal was
lost. In Mississippi in 1920 the
legislature authorized the judges of
the trial courts to adopt rules of
procedure. The judges promptly de-
clared, by rule, that the function of
conducting the examination of
jurors was theirs, not the lawyers.1
At the next meeting of the legisla-
ture, however, in 1922, the trial law-
yers in that body, who naturally are
readily able in such assemblies to
secure the passage of any technical
professional measure which they de-
sire, procured the enactment of a
law explicitly restoring to the
lawyers "the right to question
jurors" and providing that "it shall
not be necessary to propound the
questions through the presiding
judge."17 A trump card was still
available to the judges in the con-
test to preserve the integrity of the
process of selecting the personnel
of the tribunal. One of the circuit
judges was courageous enough to
play this card. He refused to follow
the statute in a criminal case, and
overruled the defense attorney's
154 Ore. L. Rev. 269 (1925).
'The rule, as set out in the argu-
ment of counsel in Funches v. Stale
125 Miss. 140, 145, 87 So. 487 (1921),
was as follows: "Rule 10. In all
cases the court alone shall examine
jurors touching their qualification, and
should the juror then appear to be
qualified, the court will ask any addi-
tional proper questions suggested by
counsel."
27C. 294, Laws of 1922; 1 Miss. Code
(1930) Art 2068.
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request for permission to question
the jurors on the ground that "the
statute relied upon is unconstitu-
tional and one which the legislature
of the State of Mississippi was
powerless to enact, as it seeks to
take the inherent power of the cir-
cuit court away and place the run-
ning of the courts in the hands of
the legislature." One may imagine
the indignation which must have
swept the ranks of trial lawyers in
the state. The Supreme Court was
naturally more influenced by pre-
vailing professional opinion than by
any feeling of responsibility for
safeguarding the dignity and de-
corum of administering justice in
trial courts. Its surrender of con-
trol to the legislature of trial ad-
ministration had already gone to
the extreme lengths of permitting
the legislature to deprive the trial
judge completely of the power to
instruct the jury at all upon the
law, except and until requested to
do so by the attorneys !18 Naturally,
it reversed the courageous trial
judge and instructed him to re-
linquish the function of examining
the jury to the lawyers.10
This contest is surging on many
fronts, of which the struggle for
control over the selection of the
'SBangs v. State 61 Miss. 363 (1883).
lglones v. State 133 Miss. 684, 98
So. 150 (1923). In Louisiana, the Su-
preme Court, though no specific statute
stood in the way, condemned as an
innovation, a rule adopted in the trial
court, reserving to the judge the ex-
amination of jurors. State v. Guidry
160 La. 655, 107 So. 479 (1926).
jury is a minor skirmish, but sig-
nificant because the lines of oppos-
ing forces are already visible. In
the Federal Courts, the custom of
selection of judges from the higher
strata of the bar,20 the judges' inde-
pendent tenure, and the frequent
contacts and association of judges
from different districts and circuits,
have contributed to the up-building
of a strong judicial esprit de corps.
judicial conferences and councils,
meetings of judicial sections in Bar
Associations, quickening relations
between judges and law schools, and
the emerging demands of a small
but influential element of the bar
who are more deeply interested in
the law as an agency of public jus-
tice than as a source of private ad-
vantage, may within the next few
decades strengthen the professional
group-consciousness of our state
judges. When this time comes, pro-
fessional pride will nerve them to
assume control of the court-room.
The trial lawyers will then take
their rightful place as ministers of
the court in marshalling facts and
legal doctrines, and will cede to the
judge the power to meet his re-
sponsibility for the dignity, dispatch
and impartiality of the trial.
20Even this custom is threatened by
danger of political coercion exercised
upon the President by the Senate.
Sears "Appointment of Federal Dis-
trict Judges" 25 I11. L. Rev. 54 (1930),
Shartel "Federal judges - Appoint-
ment, Supervision, and Removal-
Some Possibilities under the Constitu-
tion" 28 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 486-488
(1930)
